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This paper develops a new behavioral model of how experience affects willingness to trade
called adaptive loss aversion. In the model, agents do not recognize that others have different
information. Loss aversion makes them cautious. When trading, this protects them from being
exploited by better-informed traders. The degree of loss aversion λ is adjusted in response to
experience and carries over between games. When outcomes are better than anticipated, λ de-
creases; when outcomes are worse than anticipated, it increases. A repeated market experiment
with symmetric and asymmetric information is used to test the model. The data are noisier than
anticipated but some of the model’s main predictions are supported. A structural version of the
model is estimated using the experimental data and data from two previous experiments on the
winner’s curse. A range of other behavioral game theory models is also estimated using the same
data and the fit of the models is compared.
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This paper introduces adaptive loss aversion (ALA). It is a model of two aspects of trading be-
havior in settings where payoffs can depend on one’s own actions, the actions of others and the state
of nature. First, how people behave when they do not know the joint distribution of actions and sta-
tes. Second, how people adjust this behavior in response to experienced outcomes. It contrasts with
standard game theory, where agents have correct beliefs about the distribution of other’s actions and
states of nature. With such correct beliefs, the outcomes of trading will be on average as anticipated.
Without correct beliefs, however, outcomes from trading can be surprising. They can systematically
differ from what traders anticipated.
ALA is motivated by two lines of research. First, many studies have found that willingness-to-
accept (WTA) valuations exceed willingness-to-pay (WTP) valuations.1 This gap between WTA and
WTP is an anomaly for standard economic theory. A consequence of the gap is that people are less
willing to trade than standard theory predicts. A natural question is do the incentives and experience
provided by markets eliminate the gap? When traders repeatedly buy or sell items in laboratory
markets, the WTA/WTP gap often decays as traders gain market experience. More details are in
Section 1. List (2003, Experiment 4) has found similar results in a field experiment using subjects
recruited at a sportscard market. Those with relatively less intense trading experience exhibit the
gap while those with relatively more intense trading experience do not. Together, these studies show
that (a) market experience acquired in the lab and (b) certain market experience acquired in naturally
occurring markets can be sufficient to eliminate the gap.
Second, a separate line of research has found substantial evidence that people do not behave
optimally in games with asymmetric information. One example of this is behavior in the "acquiring
a company task". In this game, a buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to a seller for a company that
is worth v to the seller and 1.5v to the buyer. The value v is only known to the seller and is uniformly
distributed between 0 and 100. In the Nash equilibrium of the game, the buyer bids zero. Despite
this, Samuelson and Bazerman (1985) found most buyers bid between 50 and 75 and later studies
have found this result is surprisingly robust (see Grosskopf, Bereby-Meyer and Bazerman (2007)
and Bereby-Meyer and Grosskopf (2008)). Another example is bidding in experimental common
value auctions. Suppose the common value of an item is the sum of bidders’ private signals. In
a symmetric Nash equilibrium, bidders recognize that winning the auction implies opponents had
lower signals and shade their bids accordingly. In experiments, bidders seem not to account for
this and so frequently fall prey to the winner’s curse (see Kagel and Levin (2002) for many of the
papers).
The model proposed in this paper, ALA, brings together these two lines of research. How ALA
fits with the literature is described in Section 1. Features that distinguish ALA from earlier theories
are that the effects of experience can carry over between games with different structures and that it
1WTP is the maximum a person would be willing to pay to secure an item. WTA is the minimum a person owning the
item would be willing to accept to give it up. The WTA/WTP gap has been found in studies that use incentive-compatible
elicitation mechanisms and control for income and substitution effects (e.g. Bateman et al., 1997). Reviews of WTA/WTP
studies can be found in Horowitz and McConnell (2002), Brown and Gregory (1999), and Sayman and Onculer (2005).
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can be applied to games in which the payoffs from unplayed actions are not available. The model
is developed in Section 2. ALA has three aspects. First, it is assumed agents estimate the payoffs
from trading using a simplified model of other’s behavior rather than using knowledge of the joint
distribution of other’s actions and states of nature. Second, agents are loss averse when estimating
the payoffs from trading. In naturally occurring settings, this loss aversion protects them from being
exploited by better-informed traders. Third, after trading, agents compare the realized payoffs to the
payoffs anticipated prior to trading. When payoffs are better than anticipated, agents become less
loss averse and more willing to trade. Conversely, when they are worse, the agents become more
loss averse and less willing to trade. One could think of this as an example of the surprise-triggers-
change regularity which has been found to occur in a range of settings (Erev and Haruvy, 2016).
A neurological explanation of this type of adaptive behavior has been suggested by Schultz, Dayan
and Montague (1997).
The degree of loss aversion changing can account for some of the main results of WTA/WTP
experiments. In ALA, agents do not recognize that others may have different information so perceive
settings with symmetric and asymmetric information as equivalent. In settings with asymmetric
information, the less informed will tend to receive worse than anticipated payoffs, causing loss
aversion to increase. Conversely, settings with symmetric information will tend to deliver better
than anticipated payoffs, causing it to decrease. Assuming experiment subjects encounter some
situations with asymmetric information in their everyday lives, they will be somewhat loss averse
when they enter the lab. In standard WTA/WTP experiments, there is no asymmetric information,
hence trading gives better than anticipated payoffs. As a consequence, subjects become less loss
averse, causing the WTA/WTP gap to decay.
The predictions of ALA were explored using the results of a repeated market experiment with
208 subjects. The experiment is described in Section 3. It had two parts. In each part, subjects
bought or sold lotteries in a Vickrey auction for ten rounds under either symmetric or asymmetric
information. Section 4 presents predictions of standard game theory and ALA in the experimen-
tal environment. Standard theory predicts no WTA/WTP gap under symmetric information and a
large WTA/WTP gap under asymmetric information.2 In contrast, ALA predicts similarly sized
gaps under symmetric and asymmetric information and adaptive behavior. The effect of the posited
simplified beliefs and different levels of loss aversion on bidding is shown using static analysis. The
experimental results are presented in Section 5. The effects of the endowment, asymmetric informa-
tion, and trading experience are analyzed. The results provide some support for the predictions of
ALA. Bidders do not respond optimally to asymmetric information. Under symmetric information,
there is a WTA/WTP gap. Under asymmetric information, there is a WTA/WTP gap that is smaller
than predicted by standard theory. There is some evidence of subjects adjusting their behavior as
they gain experience.
In Section 6 a structural version of ALA is applied to the experimental data. There is now
2That standard theory can predict a WTA/WTP gap is not unique to the experimental environment. For example, Glosten
and Milgrom (1985) show how asymmetric information can lead to a bid/ask spread.
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an emerging literature on estimating structural versions of behavioral game theory models (see for
example Camerer, Nunnari and Palfrey (2016) and Turocy and Cason (2015)). This paper is the first,
to the best of my knowledge, to estimate a structural model of the process by which the WTA/WTP
gap adjusts. The parameter estimates suggest that subjects are loss averse and that loss aversion is
adjusted as the theory predicts. ALA is compared to several alternative models, including variants
of quantal response equilibrium, analogy-based expectation equilibrium, cursed equilibrium, level-k
thinking and experience-weighted attraction. The models are also applied to data from previous
experiments on common value auctions and the acquiring a company task.
Finally, Section 7 concludes. ALA and the experiment are discussed as well as some of the
broader issues involved in modeling changing behavior.
1 Related literature
This section describes how ALA fits with the literature on the endowment effect and experience and
the literature on behavioral game theory. ALA is compared and contrasted with other theories.
1.1 The endowment effect, uncertainty and market experience
The endowment effect (a WTA/WTP gap or a reluctance to exchange an endowed item for an al-
ternative) has been replicated in many experiments.3 Table 1 lists a number of studies that elicited
WTA/WTP in repeated laboratory markets. In the majority of cases, the WTA/WTP gap decays.
There are, however, exceptions. It seems both the mechanism used to elicit values and the type
of item being valued matter. A range of theories has been presented in the literature attempting to
explain the endowment effect and when it occurs. The theories involve uncertainty about the risks
of trading (Engelmann and Hollard, 2010), uncertainty about the price and aversion to bad deals
(Isoni, 2011), taste uncertainty (Loomes, Orr and Sugden, 2009), bounded rationality and heuristics
(Bateman et al., 2005; Braga and Starmer, 2005), the discovery of preferences and shaping of prefe-
rences (Loomes, Starmer and Sugden, 2003), and whether people are intending to trade (Novemsky
and Kahneman, 2005; Koszegi and Rabin, 2006).4
3There is some debate over the status of the endowment effect. Plott and Zeiler (2005) suggest that the WTA/WTP gap
reported in many studies is caused by subjects’ misconceptions. They ran an experiment with controls for misconceptions
and found that, when a full set of controls is used, there is not a WTA/WTP gap for mugs. Isoni, Loomes and Sugden (2011)
call into question Plott and Zeiler’s interpretation. They also replicate Plott and Zeiler’s results using mugs but find the same
set of controls does not eliminate the WTA/WTP gap for lotteries. The reason for the different results with mugs and lotteries
is not well understood. The current paper investigates the WTA/WTP gap for lotteries.
4Another possible explanation of the endowment effect is evolution. Heifetz and Segev (2004) argue the WTA/WTP gap
is an example of toughness and that a toughness bias may be evolutionary viable. They show how in an evolutionary model
toughness can emerge in bargaining with asymmetric information. Furthermore, Chen, Lakshminarayanan and Santos (2006)
ran experiments using capuchin monkeys and find evidence of loss aversion, which suggests it may have an evolutionary
origin. More recently, in a paper first distributed after an earlier version of this paper, Frenkel, Heller and Teper (2018) have
explored whether a combination of the endowment effect and susceptibility to the winner’s curse could be evolutionarily
stable. It is not clear, however, how these evolutionary accounts could explain the effects of experience on the endowment
effect.
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Table 1: The WTA/WTP gap and the effects of laboratory market experience
Study Good(s) Trials Main finding
Coursey, Hovis and Schulze 1987 tasting a bitter liquid 5-10 Gap reduces
Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1990 induced value tokens 1-3 No gap
pens, mugs, binoculars 4-5 Gap persists
Shogren et al. 1994 chocolate and coffee mugs 5 Gap closes
food safety 20 Gap persists
List and Shogren 1999 chocolate bars 4 Gap closes
food safety 9-10 Gap reduces
Shogren et al. 2001 chocolate and mugs (2nd price auction) 10 Gap closes
chocolate and mugs (random price auction) 10 Gap closes
Knetsch, Tang and Thaler 2001 coffee mugs (2nd price auction) 6 Gap closes
coffee mugs (9th price auction) 6 Gap widens
Loomes, Starmer and Sugden 2003 2 unresolved risky lotteries 6 Gap closes
The table summarizes the results of studies of the WTA/WTP gap in repeated markets. It does not include
studies in which WTA and WTP valuations were elicited in individual decision-making tasks, studies in
which markets were not repeated, or studies using an exchange of goods without money.
Uncertainty related to trading has been used to explain the endowment effect and the effects
of experience. Engelmann and Hollard (2010) investigate how market experience affects the en-
dowment effect in exchange of goods experiments. While not presenting an explicit model, they
conjecture that trade uncertainty (costs and risks associated with trading) is the main cause of the
endowment effect. On this view, people who overestimate the risks of trading will tend not to trade,
and, hence, not learn that trading is less risky than they feared. They reported an exchange of goods
experiment with two stages. In one treatment, subjects were forced to trade their endowment in the
first stage whereas, in another, they were not. In the second stage, trading was voluntary in both
treatments. The results show that subjects who were forced to trade in the first stage traded more
in the second stage. ALA makes broadly similar predictions. People only adjust their loss aversion
after trading, so, in a setting in which highly loss averse people estimate that all trades will not be
profitable, such people will not trade and, hence, not become less loss averse.
In repeated auction experiments, the price produced by the auction is not known when subjects
place their bids. Isoni (2011) presents a simple model that explains some features of previously
reported experimental results. In the model, utility has two components: (a) reference independent
utility for money and goods and (b) good/bad deal utility. Before the auction results are known,
a person forms an expectation of the price. If they buy below the expected price, there is positive
good deal utility; if they buy above the expected price, there is negative bad deal utility. Potential
bad deals are given more weight. This results in a WTA/WTP gap. When the auctions are repeated,
uncertainty about the price decreases, which results in the WTA/WTP gap decreasing. The model
also predicts bids will be adjusted towards previously observed prices (shaping). ALA makes similar
predictions, but they are driven by different mechanisms. The decay of the WTA/WTP gap is caused
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by loss aversion decreasing.
Another way uncertainty could explain the endowment effect is when holding a position will
deliver different levels of utility in different states of nature. Loomes, Orr and Sugden (2009) develop
a model in which such uncertainty coupled with asymmetric attitudes to losses and gains in utility,
leads to an endowment effect. The model predicts that the greater the uncertainty about the utility
an item will deliver, the larger the WTA/WTP gap for the item. In the model, if market experience is
associated with a decrease in uncertainty about the items traded, market experience would decrease
the WTA/WTP gap.5 Differences in uncertainty could explain some of the differences in the results
listed in Table 1. For example, there is no uncertainty about the value of induced value tokens and
hence no WTA/WTP gap. At the other extreme, there is plausibly considerable uncertainty about
the benefits of food safety measures, hence a WTA/WTP gap persists. In ALA, uncertainty plays an
equivalent role If there is no uncertainty, there is no WTA/WTP gap. A key difference between the
theories is that ALA allows experience to alter behavior even when there is no change in uncertainty.
Bateman et al. (2005) and Braga and Starmer (2005) have suggested heuristics as an explanation
of the WTA/WTP gap.6 The conjecture is that, when faced with incentive-compatible, value elici-
tation tasks in experiments, subjects do not report their true valuations. Instead, they use a “tactical
heuristic” or “caution heuristic.” The heuristic involves overstating incoming valuations (in which
the subject specifies the quantity of money or a good that the subject will receive) and understating
outgoing valuations (in which the subject specifies the quantity of money or a good that the subject
will give up). There are two types of setting in which, assuming bounded rationality, using such
a heuristic would be beneficial. First, in bargaining problems of the type studied by Myerson and
Satterthwaite (1983) in which a buyer and a seller have private values for an item. In such settings, a
buyer can achieve a higher payoff by understating his/her value for the item. Second, in an uncertain
common values setting, such as bidding for a jar of coins, or an asymmetric information setting,
such as buying a used car. Here, the item’s expected value conditional on buying is less than its un-
conditional expected value, so offering to trade at the unconditional expected value is a mistake. In
the private values setting, it is not clear why market experience would alter the use of the heuristic.
Experienced and inexperienced traders alike have a reason not to reveal their true preferences. On
the other hand, in the common values setting, if market experience is associated with a reduction
in the uncertainty about the item’s value, more experienced traders would have less reason to be
cautious when trading. This is consistent with List’s (2003; 2004) findings that people with more
experience trading in naturally occurring markets are less prone to exhibit the endowment effect in
simple exchange and valuation decision problems. It is this common value version of the caution
5In Loomes, Orr and Sugden’s model, it is not only market experience that can reduce uncertainty. See Humphrey, Lindsay
and Starmer (2017) for an experimental investigation of how non-market experiences influence the endowment effect.
6A related heuristics-based hypothesis is suggested by Ert and Erev (2008). They posit that people use a “lemon avoidance
heuristic” when deciding whether to accept a gamble. They found that subjects were more likely to reject a gamble when
they were approached in the hallway than when they were offered the same gamble in the lab. ALA models loss aversion as
just depending on experience, however, it is natural to think of a richer model in which the loss aversion exhibited depends
on experience and environmental factors.
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heuristic that motivates ALA.
Loomes, Starmer and Sugden (2003) investigate the effect of market experience on anomalies
with a focus on the WTA/WTP gap. They consider two broad hypotheses. First, the discovered
preference hypothesis, that, in repeated markets, traders learn to act on “true” preferences that are
consistent with standard theory. The adjustment mechanism could be refining, that markets have a
general tendency to induce traders to make decisions that increasingly reflect their true preferences.
It could also be market discipline, that agents adjust their behavior only after making errors that
are ex-post costly. ALA shares features with the market discipline hypothesis. In ALA, agents do
have underlying preferences, but decisions do not always reflect these preferences. There are also
important differences. In ALA, loss aversion is only updated after trading and is updated whether
or not there was a costly error. Under the market discipline hypothesis, behavior is only changed if
there was a costly error, and it can change whether or not the agent traded. Another difference is
that, under the market discipline hypothesis, when behavior is adjusted, it is adjusted in the direction
of the optimal behavior whereas, under ALA, this is not necessarily the case. For example, in ALA,
if an agent buys a lottery for less than its certainty equivalent in a Vickrey auction but it pays out
zero, they will tend to bid less for it in the future whereas the optimal behavior is to bid more.
Second, the hypothesis that market experience alters or shapes preferences. Loomes et al. suggest
the following mechanism “in repeated auctions in which prices have no information content, there is
a tendency for agents to adjust their bids towards the price observed in the previous market period.”
A version of shaping could explain Knetsch, Tang and Thaler’s 9th price auction results listed in
Table 1. The auctions had 10 bidders and in the buying version, the 9th highest bid was the price
and in the selling version, the 9th lowest ask was the price. Hence in both auctions, the price is set
by one of the traders who is least willing to trade. If bidders adjust their bid towards the observed
price, the WTA/WTP gap will tend to widen.
Finally, Novemsky and Kahneman (2005) explore the conjecture that, when goods are given
up “as intended,” there is no loss aversion. The idea is that loss aversion plays no role in routine
transactions. One way to model this is by using Koszegi and Rabin’s (2006) framework. They
assume agents are loss averse but model the reference point as an agent’s recently held rational
expectation about outcomes rather than their current holdings. This approach seems to explain
behavior in some contexts. It is not clear how such an explanation would work in repeated markets
using the Vickrey mechanism where it is known in advance that a fixed number of participants will
trade. In ALA, in contrast, not trading is always taken as the reference point, and the decay of the
endowment effect is due to traders becoming less loss averse.
1.2 Behavioral game theory
There are a number of behavioral game theory models that are related to ALA. ALA is princi-
pally a model of dynamics rather than equilibrium behavior. It shares some features with simple
reinforcement-learning models, such as those studied by Erev and Roth (1998). In reinforcement
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learning, pure strategies in a game have associated propensities that determine the probability that
each strategy will be played. When a given strategy is played and is successful, its propensity and,
hence, the probability of it being played again, is increased. In ALA, an agent has a degree of loss
aversion that influences his/her anticipated gains from trades involving risk and, hence, willingness
to trade. When a trade is made and the payoff is better than anticipated, he/she becomes less loss
averse and more willing to trade. There are, however, important differences between the theories.
In reinforcement learning, initial propensities are arbitrary, and agents have no understanding of the
game’s structure. In ALA, the agent’s estimate depends on the structure of the game. For instance, a
bid for a lottery in a Vickrey auction depends on the odds and prizes of the lottery. In reinforcement
learning, propensities to play strategies in repeated games are adjusted in response to experienced
outcomes. In ALA, loss aversion is adjusted, which can determine behavior across different games.
That is, the effect of experience of playing one game can carry over to other types of games.
ALA can also be compared to Camerer and Ho’s (1999) experience-weighted attraction (EWA).
EWA is similar to reinforcement learning. The key difference is that strategies that were not played
get reinforced using hypothetical payoffs, with a parameter determining the relative weight they
receive. EWA includes reinforcement learning and belief learning as special cases. ALA differs
from EWA in that loss aversion is not updated based on hypothetical payoffs.7 This approach lets
ALA be applied in settings in which the payoffs from unplayed actions are not readily available. In
EWA, like reinforcement learning, the effects of experience do not carry over to other types of game
whereas in ALA they do.
There are several ways beliefs about other’s behavior can be modeled. In level-k and cognitive
hierarchy models (Nagel, 1995; Stahl and Wilson, 1994, 1995), players have different levels. Some
assumption is made about how level zero players behave, such as that they play all actions with
equal probability, then a level k player, where k > 0, believes other players are level k− 1 players
and best responds to these beliefs. An alternative approach to modeling beliefs is used in analogy-
based expectation equilibrium (ABEE) (Jehiel, 2005; Jehiel and Koessler, 2008). In such models,
players have correct beliefs about the average behavior of others across information sets. Eyster and
Rabin’s (2005) cursed equilibrium (CE) is a similar model. In CE, a parameter χ ∈ [0,1] measu-
res cursedness, the degree to which agents do not account for others having different information.
Level-k models, ABEE and CE are static models without correct beliefs. Consequently, players will
experience outcomes inconsistent with their beliefs. In ALA, in contrast, players are loss averse and
loss aversion is adjusted. This allows players to reconcile differences between anticipated payoffs
and realized payoffs.
ALA has some similar features to the concept of behavioral equilibrium (BE) introduced by
Esponda (2008). In a BE, naive players have correct beliefs about the equilibrium distributions
of observable actions and observable states of nature but do not realize that extra information can
be obtained by considering the joint distribution of actions and states. Although ALA is not an
7It would be possible to extend ALA to incorporate updating loss aversion based on hypothetical payoffs, however, it
would make the model more complex since beliefs about payoffs from unplayed strategies would need to be specified.
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equilibrium model, it has a similar property to behavioral equilibrium in that the uninformed can
adjust their behavior so they do not repeatedly fall prey to the winner’s curse.
Compte and Postlewaite (2012) consider settings where agents do not know the joint distribution
over states of nature and the signals they receive. Agents pick a decision rule from a limited set
that on average produces good outcomes. Compte and Postlewaite argue that the ruled picked will
often involve cautious behavior in the sense of choosing alternatives that are easier to evaluate, e.g.
avoiding ambiguity or sticking with the status quo. ALA could be considered a model of how such
a rule, the level of loss aversion, is determined. Note that in ALA it is assumed the updating of loss
aversion is an automatic rather than a deliberate process.
ALA also shares features with impulse balance theory (IBT) (Selten, Abbink and Cox, 2005).
Like IBT, in ALA, there is a single variable that is adjusted (loss aversion in ALA). The theories
differ in that IBT is a theory about the end point of a learning process whereas ALA is a theory
about the learning process. Another important distinction is that, in ALA, it is differences between
obtained and anticipated payoffs that lead to changes in behavior, whereas, in IBT, the obtained
payoff is compared to hypothetical payoffs from other actions.
2 Adaptive loss aversion
Adaptive loss aversion is a behavioral model with three components. First, beliefs are based on a
simplified model of others’ behavior. Second, decisions are determined by anticipated utility, which
is composed of outcome utility and gain-loss utility. Gain-loss utility is reference-dependent with
pure strategies defining the reference point and current loss aversion, denoted λit , determining the
extra weight applied to losses. Third, after playing an action and receiving feedback, if the level of
utility realized was not anticipated the degree of loss aversion, λit , is updated. This section defines
the primitives of the model and the notation used to describe them.
Let Ω denote the set of states of nature. Consider a sequential game with a set of players N that
are indexed 1, . . . ,n. A pure strategy for player i is defined si : Hi 7→Ai where Hi is i’s information sets
and Ai is i’s actions. A profile of pure strategies for each of the players is denoted s = ⟨s1, . . . ,sn⟩
and the set of all possible profiles is denoted S. Outcome utility depends on the state of nature
and profile of strategies. Each player has an outcome utility function ui : Ω × S 7→ ℜ. In this
paper, it will be assumed outcome utility is simply the amount of money held. Each player has
beliefs µi : Ω × S−i 7→ [0,1] consisting of beliefs about the state of nature µiΩ : Ω 7→ [0,1] and
beliefs about each of the other player’s strategies µi j : S j 7→ [0,1] where i ̸= j. Player i believes the
strategies of other players are independent of each other and the state of nature, hence µi(ω,s−i) =
µiΩ(ω)∏ j∈N\i µi j(s j) where ω ∈ Ω is a state of nature and s−i ∈ S−i is a profile of pure strategies of
the other players. It is important to note that even when strategies are independent of each other and
the state of nature, actions can be correlated since a strategy can involve playing different actions
at different information sets. Assume players have correct beliefs about the probability of different
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states of nature occurring µiΩ but do not necessarily have correct beliefs about the probability of
other players playing different strategies. There are various forms the model of beliefs could take.
ALA has some flexibility in that different models can be “plugged in.” For simplicity, this paper will
mostly consider the model where player i believes every other player j follows the mixed strategy
that consists of playing all available actions with equal probability at every information set.
Anticipated utility is reference-dependent. The reference-points are defined using pure strate-
gies.8 To simplify the notation, expectations such as Σω∈ΩΣs−i∈S−i µi(ω,s)ui(ω,si,s−i) are denoted
as Eµi [ui(ω,si,s−i)]. The anticipated utility of strategy si ∈ Si from reference point r ∈ Si with be-
liefs µi is the sum of the expected outcome utility from si and the expected gain-loss utility. The












Gain-loss utility for state ω and opponents’ strategies s−i is ψ(x) where x is the difference between
the utility delivered by the reference point r and strategy si. The function ψ maps changes in utility
x to gain-loss utility by weighting losses using the agent’s current loss aversion λit > 0.
ψ(x) =
 x(λit −1) if x < 0,0 otherwise. (2)
When λ > 1, the agent is loss averse and anticipated utility depends on the reference point. When
λ = 1, the gain-loss utility is zero so anticipated utility is independent of the reference point.
A natural choice for the reference point r is a strategy that will result in no trade. In a setting
with posted prices, r could simply be rejecting the offered price. In an experimental auction where
entering some bid is required, r could be bidding zero in a buying auction (or asking the maximum
permissible amount in a selling auction).




Notice that when players have correct beliefs and λ = 1, Equation 3 gives a best response and if all
players play such responses, the outcome is a standard Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
In ALA, changes in λ are caused by differences between the anticipated utility before playing
some action and the utility after updating their reference point and receiving feedback. It is assumed
that the updating of λ happens automatically rather than as the result of a deliberate choice by the
agent. The formulation below can be applied to games generally. Let t = 1,2, . . . denote the period.
8A similar approach is taken by Sugden (2003) who defines reference-dependent preferences using Savage’s framework
of states, consequences, and acts. A key difference is that this paper defines reference-dependent preferences using strategies,
outcomes and payoffs. This makes the model readily applicable to games as well as individual decision-making problems.
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Agent i plays strategy sti and receives some feedback. Agent i updates their belief about strategies
and the state of nature in this period to µ ti . The agent’s weighted unanticipated utility, denoted zit ,
















This paper will focus on the case where feedback includes all payoff relevant information.9 In
this case, after receiving feedback an agent will update their beliefs to µ ti (ω
t ,st−i) = 0 for all outco-
mes that are inconsistent with the feedback. Hence, the anticipated utility after trading AUi (sti|sti,µ ti )




−i is the profile of strategies played by the other players and ω
t is
the state of nature.
In an auction or market, a possible refinement is calculating the anticipated utility conditional on
the realized price. It is plausible traders would respond differently to getting a worse than expected
payoff due to the price being high and getting one due to a bad state of nature occurring. Conditi-
oning the anticipated utility on the price isolates the effect of the realized state of nature from the
effect of the realized price.
At time t the degree of loss aversion λt is a decreasing function of the sum of unanticipated
utility ∑t−1j=0 zi j where zi0 is a parameter that determines loss aversion in period 1.
λit = e
−∑t−1j=0 zi j (5)
It follows that λit+1 = exp(log(λit)− zit) . When the outcomes from trading have, on average,
been worse than anticipated, loss aversion λ is greater than one. Following a trade, if the outcome is
better than anticipated, then λ decreases which increases anticipated utility in the next period. If the
outcome is worse than anticipated, then the converse occurs. If the outcome is as anticipated, then
loss aversion does not change.
The properties of ALA described above have several implications. The evolution of λ depends
on whether the outcomes of trading are better or worse than anticipated. When beliefs are correct and
λ = 1, the outcomes of trading will on average be as anticipated. This is because with λ = 1 gain-
loss utility is zero and with correct beliefs, µi(ω,s−i) equals the true probability of the outcome
occurring. Systematic differences between anticipated and obtained payoffs can result from loss
aversion or incorrect beliefs. When beliefs are correct and λ > 1, the outcomes of trading will
tend on average to be better than anticipated. This is because gain-loss utility will be negative
when calculating anticipated utility but zero when assessing the outcomes of trading. When beliefs
are incorrect and λ = 1, the outcomes of trading can on average be better or worse than anticipated
depending on whether the incorrect beliefs overweight the good or bad outcomes. Consider a lemons
9The model can also be applied to cases where agents receive feedback that only resolves some of the uncertainty, such
as auctions for unresolved lotteries or for goods with unknown quality.
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type asymmetric information setting where the seller knows the state of nature but the buyer does
not. Suppose the seller tends to sell in bad states of nature but not in good ones. The buyer does not
realize the probability of a good state conditional on buying is less than the unconditional probability
of a good state. The outcomes from trading will tend to be worse than anticipated for the buyer.
Accordingly, market experience in settings with symmetric and asymmetric information can have
different effects on λ .
3 Experimental design
This section describes the experimental design and how the experiment was implemented. The
predictions of standard theory and ALA are discussed in the next section. The environment was
chosen to capture key features of buying and selling under symmetric and asymmetric information.
Following Loomes, Starmer and Sugden (2003), median-price Vickrey auctions for lotteries were
used. Groups had an odd number of members. There were two types of auctions: buying and selling.
In a buying auction, each member of the group is endowed with cash and bids to buy one lottery
from the experimenter. The price, p, is the median bid. Everyone who bid above p pays p and
receives one lottery. In a selling auction, each member of the group is endowed with one lottery and
submits an ask to sell it to the experimenter. The price, p, is the median ask. Everyone who asked
below p receives p and gives up the lottery.
A novel feature of the design is that auctions occurred under symmetric and asymmetric infor-
mation. Let the auctioned lottery be denoted ℓ and have expected value E[ℓ]. Under symmetric
information, everyone had the same information about the state of nature when they were placing
their bids. Under asymmetric information, a minority of the members of each trading group knew
whether it was a high or low state of nature, E[ℓ|state = high]> E[ℓ|state = low], before they placed
their bids. Suppose all the informed bid bI and all uninformed bid bU and bI ̸= bU . The median bid
is the price and the majority of bids are placed by the uninformed so the price will be bU .10
In the experiment, the following lotteries were used. A low state lottery with an expected value
of 11.5 that offered a 0.37 chance of 31 credits and zero otherwise. A high state lottery with an
expected value of 83.3 that offered a 0.6 chance of 97 credits and 63 otherwise. A composite lottery
with an expected value of 52.4 that offered a 0.16 chance of 31 credits, a 0.23 chance of 63 credits,
a 0.34 chance of 97 credits, and zero otherwise. The composite lottery is constructed by combining
the low state and high state lotteries.11
10If the price were determined by the informed, then the price under asymmetric information would be no different to
what it would be if everyone were informed. In Akerlof’s (1970) market for lemons model and the acquiring a company task
described in the introduction, asymmetric information could lead to the market unraveling and no trade occurring. In the
experiment, this was not possible. An important feature of the design was that subjects were trading with the experimenter,
and the experimenter was always willing to trade at the price produced by the auction.
11We can think of the composite lottery as a lottery with two outcomes that are themselves lotteries. With probability 0.43,
the outcome of the composite lottery is the low state lottery; with probability 0.57, it is the high state lottery. The low state
lottery pays out 31 with probability 0.37, so the composite lottery will pay out 31 with probability 0.37×0.43 ≈ 0.16. The
probability values for the other payouts are calculated in the same way.
12
Table 2: The treatments
Treatment Regime Type Subjects Trading
Rounds 1-10 Rounds 11-20 groups
SS Symmetric Symmetric Buying 22 4
Selling 29 5
SA Symmetric Asymmetric Buying 22 4
Selling 31 5
AS Asymmetric Symmetric Buying 27 5
Selling 31 5
AA Asymmetric Asymmetric Buying 24 4
Selling 22 4
Each row of the table represents a treatment. Each trading group consisted of five or seven subjects.
Each subject was assigned to a trading group. Members of a trading group bid against each other
in a series of 20 auction rounds. After each auction, the lotteries were played out and subjects told
how much they had made or lost in the round. Each trading group and, hence, each subject was
assigned to one of eight treatments. The organization of the treatments is shown in Table 2. The
experiment was divided into two parts, each consisting of 10 rounds. Some treatments switched
between symmetric and asymmetric information after ten rounds while others did not. In the rest of
this paper, the abbreviations SS, SA, AS, and AA shown in the first column of the table are used to
refer to the treatments.
A total of 208 subjects participated in the experiment.12 Subjects were divided into trading
groups of five or seven that traded in the same auctions. In the buying treatments, subjects were
endowed with credits and bid to buy a lottery (the credits were exchanged for cash at the end of the
experiment). Subjects completed the sentence “I am willing to buy the lottery from the experimenter
if the price is less than __ credits” by typing a value. In the selling treatments, they were endowed
with a lottery and submitted asks to sell it. Subjects completed, “I am willing to sell the lottery to
the experimenter if the price is more than __ credits.” When all subjects had entered values, the
computer selected the median as the market price.
In rounds with symmetric information, the composite lottery was traded. In rounds with asym-
metric information, the minority were informed (two in trading groups of five, three in trading
groups of seven). The informed traders were told whether it was a high or low state before bidding;
the uninformed traders were not. So, effectively, the informed were trading either the high or low
state lotteries, while the uninformed were trading the composite lottery. The uninformed were told
that there were informed subjects in the trading group and told what the informed would have been
told.
Figure 1 shows how the lotteries were presented to the subjects when they were prompted to
place bids (complete screenshots of the experimental software are included in a supplementary file).
12The experiment was conducted at the University of Nottingham. Subjects were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015).
The experimental software was programmed using Java.
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Figure 1: Presentation of lotteries
(a) Unresolved lottery (b) Resolved lottery
(c) High state (d) Low state
Figure 1a was shown to everyone. In rounds with asymmetric information, the informed were also
shown Figure 1c or Figure 1d so that they knew before bidding whether it was a high or low state.
The lottery outcomes were determined by computer-generated random numbers. There was one
lottery outcome per trading group per round. The outcomes were revealed to subjects after the
outcome of each auction. An animated spinning arrow, Figure 1b, was used to present the lottery
outcomes.
A paper copy of the instructions was given to the subjects (included in a supplementary file).
Before the experiment started, the experimenter read the instructions aloud and then gave subjects
the opportunity to ask questions. There were just two versions of the instructions. One version
covered the four buying treatments; the other covered the four selling treatments. All subjects
were told about symmetric and asymmetric information even if they did not participate in auctions
under both regimes. The motivation for this was to isolate the effect of knowing about asymmetric
information from actually experiencing it. A subject, for example, in round 9 of the SS buying
treatment had no way of knowing whether he/she was in the SS or SA treatment. Approximately 20
subjects participated in each session and were randomly assigned to groups. Within a session, all
groups were assigned to buying treatments or all were assigned to selling treatments. However, not
all groups were assigned to the same treatment. For instance, a single session with four groups could
have groups assigned to each of the SS, SA, AS, and AA treatments. These features were intended
to minimize treatment effects other than differences in the information structure and to allow results
from the different treatments to be pooled in the analysis. Each session lasted between 40 and 60
minutes. The average payment was £8.17.
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The details of the market mechanism and the lottery can be used to produce predictions for standard
theory and ALA.
When bidders are risk-neutral expected utility maximizers, there is a Nash equilibrium in which
WTA equals WTP under symmetric information.13 Suppose there are three bidders to buy the lottery
ℓ in a median price auction. It is readily verified that for all three bidders, it is a weakly dominant
strategy to bid E[ℓ], the expected value of the item. The same is true for a selling auction. Under
asymmetric information, in contrast, there is an equilibrium in which WTA exceeds WTP. Suppose
that one of the bidders is told if it is a high or low state. It is a weakly dominant strategy for the
informed to bid E[ℓ|state = low] in the low state and E[ℓ|state = high] in the high state. The other
two bidders, the uninformed, know the informed will observe the state of nature before bidding
but cannot observe it themselves. There are no weakly dominant strategies for the uninformed.14
13Risk-neutrality is assumed because the stakes in the experiment are relatively modest. If agents maximize the expected
utility of wealth and do not exhibit extreme risk aversion over high stakes, Rabin’s (2000) calibration theorem suggests they
should be approximately risk-neutral over modest stakes. If income and wealth enter separately into agents’ utility functions,
then the resultant model can predict behavior, such as a WTA/WTP gap and preference reversals, that is typically thought of
as inconsistent with standard theory (Lindsay, 2013).
14Let b̃ satisfy E[ℓ|state = low]< b̃ < E[ℓ]. If the informed player bids b̃ in both states and the first uninformed player also
bids b̃, the best response for the second uninformed player is to bid b > b̃, whereas if the informed bids b = E[ℓ|state = low]
in the low state and b̄ = E[ℓ|state = high] in the high state and the first uninformed player bids b̃, the best response for the
second uninformed player is to bid b < b̃. Hence, there is no weakly dominant strategy for the uninformed.
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However, how they bid can be predicted using iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies.15
For the informed, bidding E[ℓ|state = low] in the low state and E[ℓ|state = high] in the high state
weakly dominates all other strategies, so all other strategies can be removed. In the resulting game,
it is a weakly dominant strategy for the uninformed to bid E[ℓ|state = low]. Conversely, in a median
price selling auction, after the informed’s weakly dominated strategies are deleted, it is a weakly
dominant strategy for the uninformed to ask E[ℓ|state = high]. So the uninformed have a reason to
bid lower in buying auctions than they ask in selling auctions.
Under ALA, the bid that gives the highest anticipated utility can be found using Equation 3 from
Section 2. The optimal bid will depend on the value of λ . Figure 2 shows comparative statics. The
solid lines are the predictions of ALA with different levels of loss aversion λ . The reference point is
not trading (bidding zero when buying or asking the maximum allowed amount when selling). The
dashed lines are the risk-neutral Nash equilibrium bids obtained by the iterative deletion of weakly
dominated strategies. For ALA, when λ < 1, WT P >WTA; when λ = 1, WT P =WTA; and when
λ > 1, WT P < WTA. The WTA/WTA gap widens as λ increases above one. Under symmetric
information and for the informed under asymmetric information, the Nash and ALA predictions
coincide when λ = 1. For the uninformed under asymmetric information, as λ increases above one,
WT P and WTA approach their respective Nash values.
The intuition of dynamics under ALA is as follows. Agents perceive settings with symmetric and
asymmetric information as equivalent and adjust λ when trading produces better or worse than anti-
cipated outcomes. Suppose subjects enter the laboratory with loss aversion λ = 2. Under symmetric
information, they will bid below the expected value of the lottery and ask above it. When they trade,
on average, the outcomes of trading will be better than anticipated, so λ will be adjusted downwards
towards one. Under asymmetric information, the uninformed will bid above the Nash buying value
and ask below the Nash value. When they trade, on average the outcomes of trading will be worse
than anticipated, so λ will be adjusted upwards, and bids will adjust towards their respective Nash
values (WTA reaches its Nash value when λ = 7.6 and WT P reaches it when λ = 14.1).
The testable predictions of ALA can be summarized as follows.
1. The uninformed subjects will not take account of the informed’s extra information.
2. If subjects at the start of the experiment are loss averse, then there will be a WTA/WTP gap.
Under symmetric information, subjects will underestimate the payoffs from trading, so rea-
lized outcomes from trading will, on average, be better than anticipated. If subjects become
less loss averse in response, then the size of the WTA/WTP gap will tend to decrease. Con-
versely, under asymmetric information, the uninformed will tend to overestimate the payoffs
from trading, so realized outcomes from trading will, on average, be worse than anticipated.
The WTA/WTP gap will tend to persist or increase.
3. Subjects will change their bidding behavior when outcomes from trading are better or worse
15See Marx (1999) for a discussion of iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies.
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than anticipated.
As well as considering these specific predictions, the overall fit of ALA will be assessed and com-
pared to other models using structural estimation.
5 Experimental results
The 208 subjects were divided into 36 trading groups (Table 2 shows how the subjects and trading
groups were divided among the eight treatments). In each auction, every subject submitted a bid or
ask. Every subject completed 20 auctions giving a total of 4,160 observations. A subject is classified
as ‘informed’ if for at least one part of the experiment, he/she was an informed trader. A subject
is classified as ‘uninformed’ if he/she was never an informed trader. This classification enables the
within subject effect of different information structures to be compared. The evolution of bids and
asks submitted by uninformed and informed subjects in each of the treatments is shown in Figure 3.
Mean buying bids are generally below mean selling bids. First, consider the uninformed. There is
mixed evidence of trends across rounds. In the SS treatment, there is no clear trend. On the other
hand, in the AS treatment, it appears a WTA/WTP gap gradually closes after the switch to symmetric
information. In the AS and SA treatments, it appears that bidding behavior gradually changes when
the market switches between symmetric and asymmetric information. There are some apparent
spillover effects. For example, the round 11 bidding in the AS and SA treatments is similar to round
10 bidding despite the change in information structure. The informed use their extra information,
bidding higher in the high payout state. In addition, the informed exhibit a WTA/WTP gap, which
is particularly apparent in the AA treatment.
The following analysis tests some of the qualitative predictions of ALA prior to the structural
analysis in Section 6.
ALA predicts that people do not take into account that others may have extra information.
Result 1—Asymmetric information: Under asymmetric information, the informed exploit their
extra information. The uninformed do not fully anticipate the consequences of the informed using
this extra information.
Support. Table 3 shows the mean bids and asks (a) under symmetric information and (b) of the
informed and uninformed under asymmetric information. It also shows the mean lottery payouts
under asymmetric information conditional on whether the uninformed trade. In both buying and
selling auctions, the informed bid high in the high state and low in the low state. As a consequence,
in buying auctions, the informed tend to buy when it is a high state leaving the uninformed to buy
in the low state. This means the expected value of the lottery conditional on an uninformed buying
is less than the expected value of the lottery. The uninformed do not fully anticipate this, and, on
average, bid 42.86 when the expected value of the lottery conditional on them trading is just 30.07.
17
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Table 3: Bidding and Lottery Payouts
Buying Selling
Bidding under Symmetric Information
Bid 49.20 53.51
(0.58) (0.45)
Bidding under Asymmetric Information
Informed bids
High state 64.68 77.58
(0.85) (0.89)





Lottery Payouts under Asymmetric Information
Uninformed trades 30.07 74.94
(2.26) (2.16)
Uninformed does not trade 60.60 40.37
(1.98) (1.87)
The table shows mean bids and asks in different treatments. It also shows the mean lottery payout under asymmetric
information conditional on an uninformed subject trading. Standard errors are in parentheses.
The converse occurs in selling auctions. On average, the uninformed ask 53.92 for the lottery when
the expected value of the lottery conditional on them selling is actually 74.94.
Under ALA, if subjects at the start of the experiment are loss averse, then there will be a
WTA/WTP gap. Furthermore, under symmetric information, subjects will underestimate the pa-
yoff from trading, so realized outcomes from trading will, on average, be better than anticipated.
If subjects become less loss averse in response, then the size of the WTA/WTP gap will tend to
decrease.
Result 2—WTA/WTP gap: Under symmetric information, there is some evidence of a WTA/WTP
gap that closes in a repeated market. Under asymmetric information, there is a larger WTA/WTP
gap and no evidence that it closes in a repeated market.
Support. The following linear random effects model is estimated
bit = β0 +β1buyingi +β2buyingexperienceit +β3sellingexperienceit + ci + εit , (6)
where bit is the amount bid or asked by subject i in round t. The variable buyingi is one if
subject i was in a buying treatment and zero otherwise. The variable buyingexperienceit is the
number of rounds prior to t where subject i was buying under the same information structure;
sellingexperienceit is the number of rounds prior to t where subject i was selling under the same
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Table 4: Evolution of bids
Symmetric information Uninformed asymmetric information
Buying −5.17∗∗ −12.50∗∗∗
(1.94) (3.01)
Buying experience 0.24∗∗ 0.10
(0.09) (0.15)






The table shows the results of estimating equation 6 using (a) bids submitted under symmetric information and (b) bids
submitted by the uninformed under asymmetric information.
Significance levels: * denotes 5 percent; ** denotes 1 percent; *** denotes 0.1 percent.
information structure. Note, a given subject was either buying for the entire experiment or selling
for the entire experiment. Round invariant subject-specific effects are denoted ci , and the residual
is denoted εit .
The results of estimating two variants of equation 6 are shown in Table 4. In the first column,
labeled symmetric information, the model is estimated using the bids placed in rounds with symme-
tric information, pooling observations from the relevant treatments. With controls for experience, on
average, bids in buying auctions are 5.17 points below those in selling auctions (the null hypothesis
β1 = 0 is rejected, p = 0.008). As subjects gain experience of buying under symmetric information,
bids increase (the null hypothesis β2 = 0 is rejected, p = 0.009). Conversely, as subjects gain ex-
perience of selling, asks decrease (the null hypothesis β3 = 0 is rejected, p = 0.041). In the second
column, labeled uninformed asymmetric information, the model is estimated using the bids placed
in rounds with asymmetric information by the uninformed. The estimates imply the average bids
in buying auctions are 12.5 points below those in selling auctions (the null hypothesis β1 = 0 is
rejected, p < 0.001). The effects of experience are smaller than under symmetric information and
not statistically significant.
In ALA, changes in bidding behavior are due to changes in loss aversion. Loss aversion decre-
ases when the outcomes of trading are better than anticipated and increases when they are worse.
To explore whether this could account for the effects of trading experience, the effect of lottery out-
comes after trading on subsequent bidding was studied. Since a trader’s loss aversion, λit , is not
observable, a proxy for the cumulative difference between the anticipated and realized outcomes of
trading is used. It is based on the realized lottery payout, xit ′ , and the expected value of the lottery
E(Xit ′) that each subject i faced in each round t ′. Let Tit denote the set of rounds prior to t where sub-
ject i traded. A cumulative measure was constructed as cumulative lotteryit = ∑t ′∈Tit (xit ′ −E(Xit ′)).
Result 3—Lottery outcomes and bidding: Bids are higher when lottery outcomes after trading
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Table 5: The effect of lottery outcomes on bidding
Selling Buying Pooled
Symmetric Asymmetric Symmetric Asymmetric
Cumulative lottery 0.0280*** 0.0186* 0.0380** 0.0219* 0.0300***
(0.0073) (0.0086) (0.0121) (0.0106) (0.0056)
Observations 1200 1060 930 970 4160
Subjects 91 84 71 73 208
The table shows the results of estimating equation 7 with different sets of bids. The constant terms and coefficients for con-
trol variables were estimated but are not shown in the table for brevity. Significance levels: * denotes 5 percent; ** denotes
1 percent; *** denotes 0.1 percent. Standard errors are in parentheses.
have been higher than expected.
Support. The following linear random effects model is estimated using several subsets of the bids
bit = β1 h1 + · · ·+β4 h4 +β5 cumulative lotteryit + ci + εit (7)
where bit is the amount bid or asked by subject i in round t. The information set from which
subjects placed bids is captured by a series of dummy variables h1, . . . ,h4 (which includes entries for
symmetric, uninformed, informed-high, informed-low). Round invariant subject-specific effects are
denoted ci , and the residual is denoted εit . The results of estimating the model using different subsets
of bids are shown in Table 5. The coefficient for cumulative lotteryit is positive and significantly
different from zero when the model is estimated using all bids and using various subsets of bids. It
is worth noting that these results cannot readily be explained by rational belief updating or income
effects. The lottery outcomes in different rounds were independent so observing the payoff in one
round was not informative about the payoffs in subsequent rounds. The effects are observed for both
buying and selling. In selling, in rounds where the subject trades, the seller’s income is unaffected
by the lottery outcome.16
6 Structural Analysis
In this section, two structural variants of ALA are estimated. Later, in Section 6.1, they are compared
to five alternative models drawn from the literature on behavioral game theory.
In the experiment, possible bids were integers between 1 and 100 inclusive. Rather than assu-
ming agents always pick a strategy that maximizes anticipated utility, it was assumed the value bid
was picked according to a logit function with parameter γ ≥ 0. In all the models, the probability of
16Braga, Humphrey and Starmer (2009) observe a similar effect in repeated auctions to sell “P-bets” (high probability of
getting a small prize) and “dollar-bets” (low probability of getting a large prize). They find evidence consistent with their
loss experience hypothesis. Subjects ask less for a lottery after holding a lottery and it paying out zero; subjects ask more for
a lottery after selling it and seeing it give a high payout.
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AUi(x) is the anticipated utility from bidding x at the current information set and given the
current beliefs and reference point.17 As γ increases, the probability that a strategy is chosen that
maximizes anticipated utility approaches one. The variants of ALA and alternative models differ in
how the anticipated utility is calculated.
In ALA, the anticipated utility is calculated as described in Section 2. In the model, it is assumed
that an agent’s degree of loss aversion λ is adjusted in response to experienced losses and gains. It is
natural to suppose different individuals will have had different experiences prior to the experiment
and, hence, will have different values of λ upon entering the lab. To allow for heterogeneity of
this type, it is assumed λ1, a subject’s loss aversion at the start of the experiment is drawn from
a log-normal distribution.18 First, a variant of ALA labeled Constant Loss Aversion (CLA) was
estimated. In this model, an individual’s loss aversion is constant within the experiment. The vector
of parameters to estimate θ comprises the precision γ and the mean and standard deviation (s.d.) of
λ1. If λ1 were observable in addition to the bids, the parameters could be estimated by maximizing
the following likelihood function.
Li(θ) = f (λ1|θ) ∏
t
Pr(bit |λ1,θ) (9)





Pr(bit |λ1,θ) dλ1 (10)
The integral was evaluated numerically. The parameters that maximized the likelihood function were
then found using numerical optimization. A similar likelihood function was used to calculate the
parameters of the model with adaptive loss aversion (labeled ALA). Denote subject i’s loss aversion
in round t as λit = g(λ1,w,Hit), which is calculated using the history of play Hit and the updating





Pr(bit |g(λ1,θ ,Hit) ,θ) dλ1 (11)
The parameter estimates for ALA and CLA are shown in the first two columns of Table 6. The
17The approach taken is similar to Mckelvey and Palfrey’s (1998) logit-AQRE. Players are modeled as choosing an action
at an information set rather than complete plans of action. The payoffs used are calculated conditional on reaching the
information set. The key difference is that the payoffs in logit-AQRE are expected utilities whereas in Equation 8 the payoffs
are anticipated utility calculated with loss aversion and non-equilibrium beliefs.
18In the experiment, there were 20 observed bids per subject, which is not enough to estimate parameters separately for
each subject. If there were significantly more observations per subject, then estimating individual-level parameters might be
feasible. See Lindsay (2011) for an example of this approach.
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Table 6: Maximum likelihood estimates
ALA CLA EWA Level-k CE ABEE QRE
precision, γ 0.398 0.397 0.287 0.410 0.232 0.210 0.200
mean of λ1 1.915 1.890






weight initial-attraction, N(0) 11.673
attraction depreciation rate, φ 0.885
experience depreciation rate, ρ 0.947
weight forgone, δ 0.132
log likelihood -17,254 -17,258 -16,582 -17,585 -17,931 -17,942 -18,256
AIC 34,517 34,522 33,173 35,178 35,867 35,886 36,515
BIC 34,542 34,541 33,205 35,203 35,879 35,892 36,521
The table shows maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of the models. AIC is the Akaike information criterion and BIC is
the Bayesian information criterion.
estimates suggest the following.
Result 4—Adaptive loss aversion: Subjects are initially loss averse and adjust their loss aversion
in response to experience.
Support. For ALA, the estimate for the average initial loss aversion is 1.915. A value above one
indicates loss aversion. The point estimate for w, the weight given to unanticipated losses and gains
when updating loss aversion after trading, is 0.000547. A positive value indicates that, when the
outcome of trading is better than anticipated, loss aversion decreases and vice-versa. In ALA loss
aversion can vary whereas in CLA it is fixed. ALA has a better log-likelihood score but it also has
one extra free parameter (w). The AIC and BIC measures of goodness of fit include penalties for
the number of free parameters. On both these measures, ALA has a better (lower) score suggesting
the better performance of ALA is not merely due to it having more parameters. CLA is nested in
ALA which allows a likelihood ratio test to be used to test the null hypothesis that w = 0 against the
alternative that w ̸= 0. The test rejects the null hypothesis with a p-value of 0.0032. Hence, there is
statistically significant evidence of adaptive loss aversion.
The size of the estimate of w and equation 5 suggest behavior adapts relatively slowly. Suppose,
for example, λt = 2. If the agent receives an outcome 25 points better than anticipated, then λt+1 ≈
1.97; if the outcome is 25 points worse than anticipated, then λt+1 ≈ 2.03. Note that relatively slow
adaptive behavior is consistent with the observed evolution of bids shown earlier in Figure 3.
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6.1 Alternative models
Five alternative models to ALA were estimated. They are variants of models drawn from the litera-
ture on behavioral game theory: quantal response equilibrium (QRE) (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995),
analogy-based expectation equilibrium (ABEE) (Jehiel, 2005), cursed equilibrium (CE) (Eyster and
Rabin, 2005), level-k (Stahl and Wilson, 1994, 1995; Nagel, 1995), and experience-weighted at-
traction (EWA) (Camerer and Ho, 1999). The first three are equilibrium models defined by a fixed
point of a function mapping from beliefs to actions. Level-k and EWA do not have an equilibrium
defined by such a fixed point. In equilibrium models and level-k, bidding behavior is not updated in
response to experience whereas in EWA, like ALA, it is.
QRE In this model, agents have correct beliefs about the expected utility from playing different
actions but make errors (described by equation 8) when selecting actions. Given player i’s beliefs
about the distribution of others’ bids, the anticipated utility from each possible bid for player i can be
calculated. Given the anticipated utilities and a value for the precision parameter γ , the distribution
of player i’s bids can be found. Equilibrium occurs when all players are responding to their beliefs
according to the logit function, and all players’ beliefs are correct. The equilibrium distribution of
bids σ∗γ for a given value of γ can be found numerically. The likelihood of observed bids can be
calculated using σ∗γ . This, in turn, allows the maximum likelihood estimate of γ to be found by






ABEE This model combines Jehiel’s analogy-based expectation equilibrium with QRE. In this mo-
del, the uninformed have coarse beliefs about the distribution of informed bids across the high
and low states. They do not account for the informed conditioning their bids on whether a high
state obtains. More precisely, when the true distribution of bids of the informed is σ∗ (b|ω) with
b ∈ [1,100] and ω ∈ {ωH ,ωL}, the uninformed’s beliefs µ (b|ω) about the distribution of informed
bids is given by the following.
µ (b|ω) = Pr(ωH)σ∗(b|ωH)+Pr(ωL)σ∗(b|ωL) (13)
The model has one parameter, γ . ABEE predicts similar bidding patterns to QRE for symmetric
information and for the informed under asymmetric information, but markedly different ones for the
uninformed under asymmetric information.
CE This model combines Eyster and Rabin’s cursed equilibrium with QRE. A cursedness parame-
ter, χ ∈ [0,1], determines the extent to which the uninformed do not recognize that the informed
have extra information. Using the same notation as used for ABEE above, the uninformed’s beliefs
σ∗ (b|ω) about the distribution of informed bids is given by the following.
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µ (b|ω) = χ (Pr(ωH)σ∗(b|ωH)+Pr(ωL)σ∗(b|ωL))+(1−χ)σ∗(b|ω) (14)
Notice that when χ = 1, CE coincides with ABEE, and that when χ = 0, µ (b|ω) = σ∗(b|ω) im-
plying CE coincides with QRE. With the estimated value of χ = 0.841, the predicted bidding pat-
terns are closer to ABEE than QRE.
Level-k This model combines level-k thinking with logit responses. Agents are allowed to have one
of three levels of reasoning. Level 0 bid uniformly between 1 and 100. Level 1 respond to level 0
with logit errors. Level 2 respond to level 1 with logit errors. The model has four parameters (three





Pr(bit |θ ,k) (15)
EWA Camerer and Ho’s (1999) experience-weighted attraction is applied as follows. Variables
representing the attraction of bidding different amounts determine the choice of bids. Abi (t) deno-
tes player i’s attraction for a bidding b in period t. The attractions are then used to calculate bid









Players have a vector of 100 attractions for each information set they might encounter (symme-
tric information, asymmetric information uninformed, asymmetric information informed high state,
asymmetric information informed low state). EWA does not specify what the initial values of the
attractions are. For the purpose of estimating the model, the initial attraction Abi (0) for each bid b
was set equal to the expected payoff from biding b at the information set when all other bidders’
bids are drawn from uniform distributions. Note that with these initial attractions, EWA makes the
same predictions about first-round bidding as level-k does when all agents are level 1 and the same
predictions as ALA does when λ1 = 1.
As well as a set of attractions, each player has a variable N(t) for each information set. This
variable is used when updating attractions and can be thought of as measuring the amount of expe-
rience.
N(t) and Abi (t) are updated using the following equations.
N(t) = ρN(t −1)+1, t ≥ 1 (17)
The parameter ρ measures the rate that past experience depreciates.
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Table 7: Alternative models
ALA CLA EWA Level-k CE ABEE QRE
Logit errors ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Correct beliefs partially partially !
Equilibrium ! ! !
Heterogeneity ! ! ! !









The parameter φ is the attraction depreciation rate. The function πi(b, t) gives i’s payoff for
bidding b in round t. The top expression in the piece-wise equation specifies how attractions for
played actions get updated and the bottom one, how attractions for unplayed actions get updated.
The expressions are the same except that forgone payoffs are weighted by parameter δ .
When EWA was estimated attractions were only updated if an agent traded (the same was true
for updating loss aversion in ALA). This is because in the experiment, subjects could calculate the
payoffs from unplayed actions after trading but not after not trading. There are five parameters to
estimate: the precision γ , the initial weight given to attractions N(0), the attraction depreciation rate
φ , the experience depreciation rate ρ , and the weight given to forgone payoffs δ .
The results of estimating the models are shown in Table 6. The measures of fit allow their
performance to be compared.
Result 5—Alternative models: Among the estimated models, EWA performed best followed by
ALA.
Support. When the log likelihood score of the models is compared, EWA performed best followed
by ALA. The ordering is the same even if it is based on the BIC or AIC, which both include a penalty
for increasing the number of estimated parameters.
The key features of the models are summarized in Table 7. QRE is the only model where
agents have correct beliefs about the joint distribution of other’s actions and states of nature. In
CE and ABEE, agents have correct beliefs about the marginal distribution of others’ actions but
not about the relevant joint distribution. In level-k, CLA, and ALA, agents have beliefs about the
distribution of others’ actions which typically are not correct. In EWA, beliefs are not defined.
Among the estimated models, the following features are associated with better performance. First,
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relaxing the assumption of correct beliefs. Second, allowing non-equilibrium behavior. The four
non-equilibrium models (ALA, CLA, EWA and level-k) outperform the four equilibrium models.
A notable feature of the non-equilibrium models is that they allow for individual heterogeneity. In
level-k, agents have different cognitive levels. In EWA, agents start with identical attractions for each
action but these diverge as agents gain different experiences. In CLA and ALA, they have different
initial levels of loss aversion. Finally, factors that differentiate the non-equilibrium models are loss
aversion, learning, and whether learning carries over between games with different structures. EWA
fits the data best, which suggests it is a good model to use in settings where agents repeatedly face
instances of the same game. ALA performs better than the models without learning. An advantage
of ALA over EWA is that it can be used in settings where agents face a series of games with different
structures and in settings where payoffs from unplayed actions are unknown.
6.2 Data from experiments on the winner’s curse
ALA is distinguished from some other learning models by two key features. First, the effects of
experience can carry over between settings, such as between games with different structures or be-
tween information sets within a game. Second, it can be applied to settings where the payoffs from
unplayed strategies are not available. One such setting is a sequential game where the second mo-
ver responds to the first mover. After playing the game, the first mover does not know how the
second mover would have responded to a different first move, hence the first mover does not know
the payoffs from unplayed strategies. Common value auctions and the acquiring a company task
discussed in the introduction are natural games to study to explore these features. This section ap-
plies ALA and other behavioral models to data from Avery and Kagel’s (1997) symmetric common
value auction treatment and to data from Bereby-Meyer and Grosskopf’s (2008) baseline acquiring
a company game treatment.
Common value auctions In Avery and Kagel’s baseline “symmetric” treatment, 23 bidders took
part in a series of two bidder second price common value auctions. All of the subjects completed 18
auction rounds and 14 subjects returned to the lab and completed another 24 auction rounds. In each
round, each bidder received an independent signal drawn uniformly from the range [1.00,4.00] with
1 cent increments. This meant there were 301 possible realizations of the signal, so bidders would
rarely find themselves bidding at an information set they had encountered before. The common
value of the item was simply the sum of the two bidders’ signals. Bids were allowed in the range
[0.00,10.00] with 1 cent increments, hence there were 1001 admissible values a bid could take.
The parameters of ALA, CLA, level-k, CE, ABEE and QRE were estimated using the same
approach as described previously.
Result 6—Common value auctions: Among the estimated models, ALA and CLA performed best.
Adaptive behavior is not detectable.
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Support. The fit of the alternative models is reported in the top section of Table 8. For the common
value auction data, ALA and CLA have approximately equal log likelihood scores. Accordingly,
since it has one less parameter, CLA has slightly better AIC and BIC scores. As before, a likelihood
ratio test can be used to test the null hypothesis that w = 0 against the alternative that w ̸= 0. The
null cannot be rejected for the common value auction data (p = 0.4975).
Acquiring a company In Bereby-Meyer and Grosskopf’s baseline “Ball-100” treatment, 21 subjects
played the role of buyer for 100 rounds with a computer playing the role of seller. As described in
the introduction, the game involves the buyer making an offer to the seller for a company. The
company is worth v to the seller and 1.5v to the buyer. The value of v is an integer distributed
uniformly between 0 and 100 with the value known to the seller but not the buyer. Allowed offers
were integers in the range [0,150], hence there were 151 admissible values an offer could take.
So far, agents in CLA and ALA, and the level 1 agents in level-k have been modeled as best
responding to agents who bid all permissible values with equal probability. In the acquiring a com-
pany game, if a seller accepts all offers with probability 0.5, then the buyer’s best response is to
offer zero. It seems plausible that buyers might believe offering more would increase the chance of
the offer being accepted while at the same time not appreciating that the seller’s decisions depend
on the seller’s private information. Hence, level 1 buyers in level-k and all buyers in ALA were
modeled as having the following beliefs about the seller’s probability of accepting an offer b where




The value of η was estimated with the other parameters of the models. When η = 0, all offers
are accepted with probability 0.5. For moderate values of η , the probability of acceptance increases
with the size of the offer. When η is large, only offers b ≥ 50 are accepted. Note that the expected
value of the company to the seller is 50, hence such beliefs are equivalent to believing the seller
ignores their private information. Level 2 buyers in level-k were modeled as correctly believing the
seller would use their private information about v when deciding whether to accept an offer.
Again, the parameters of ALA, CLA, level-k, CE, ABEE and QRE were estimated.
Result 7—Acquiring a company: Among the estimated models, ALA performed best. There is
evidence of adaptive loss-aversion
Support. The results are shown in the bottom section of Table 8. Note that the estimates of η are
greater than zero which is consistent with buyers believing higher offers have a greater chance of
being accepted. For the acquiring a company task data, ALA performed best on all three measures
(log likelihood, AIC and BIC). As before, a likelihood ratio test can be used to test the null hypot-
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Table 8: Estimation using data from winner’s curse experiments
ALA CLA Level-k CE ABEE QRE
Common value auctions
precision, γ 0.156 0.156 0.098 0.088 0.088 0.082
mean of λ1 0.667 0.697






log likelihood -4,417 -4,417 -4,469 -4,504 -4,504 -4,608
AIC 8,842 8,841 8,947 9,013 9,011 9,217
BIC 8,855 8,855 8,965 9,022 9,015 9,222
Acquiring a company
precision, γ 0.079 0.078 0.068 0.065 0.052 0.0002
mean of λ1 1.280 1.508
standard deviation of λ1 1.989 2.040
adjustment, w 0.000296





log likelihood -9,447 -9,453 -9,752 -9,824 -10,533
AIC 18,905 18,913 19,509 19,649 21,069
BIC 18,933 18,936 19,520 19,655 21,075
The table shows maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of the models. AIC is the Akaike informa-
tion criterion and BIC is the Bayesian information criterion.
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hesis that w = 0 against the alternative that w ̸= 0. The null is rejected for the acquiring a company
task data (p = 0.0011).
7 Discussion
ALA and the experiment were motivated by the conjecture that in markets people generally do
not recognize that others may have different information and that loss aversion protects them to
some extent from the losses they might otherwise incur. Loss aversion makes traders cautious about
trading. The degree of loss aversion is adjusted after trading depending on whether the outcome of
trading was better or worse than anticipated. The experimental results are consistent with previous
studies in that under symmetric information there is a gap between WTA and WTP for lotteries
and there is some evidence that this gap decays in a repeated market. The evidence for the decay
of the WTA/WTP gap, however, is not as pronounced as in some previous studies. This could be
because resolving the lotteries after trading made feedback noisier than in previous studies that used
unresolved lotteries. The most important novel finding is the evidence of adaptive loss aversion. The
version of ALA that allowed loss aversion to adjust fit the data better than CLA, the version in which
loss aversion was fixed. Both ALA and CLA performed better than the variants of QRE, CE, ABEE,
and level-k that were estimated on all the data-sets studied. However, ALA was outperformed by
EWA on the data from the experiment reported in this paper. An advantage of ALA over EWA is
that it can be used in settings where agents face a series of games with different structures and in
settings where payoffs from unplayed actions are unknown.
ALA makes non-standard assumptions that at first sight may appear puzzling. Loss aversion is
updated whereas beliefs about others’ behavior are held fixed. One could argue it would be more
natural to model changing behavior as due to updating beliefs about others’ behavior. There are,
however, at least two difficulties with this approach. The first concerns tractability. The joint dis-
tribution of other’s actions and states of nature is a more complex object than a single variable
representing loss aversion. For equilibrium models with consistent beliefs, this complexity is ma-
nageable since there is no need to update beliefs. For equilibrium models with partially consistent
beliefs (ABEE and CE) and for level-k there is no updating of beliefs. This is despite the fact that
average trading outcomes would have been inconsistent with beliefs. The difficulty is that to model
out of equilibrium behavior, not only would the model need to specify agents’ beliefs about the joint
distribution and how they were updated, it would also need to specify agents’ beliefs about how
the distribution changes as others update their beliefs and hence change their behavior. The second
concerns accounting for observed behavior. Previous studies have found WTA/WTP gaps decay
in repeated markets. This can be readily accounted for by decreasing loss aversion. It is harder
to account for in terms of updating beliefs about others’ behavior. The experiments typically used
dominant strategy elicitation mechanisms (so beliefs about others’ behavior do not matter). Further-
more, Result 3 showed that bidding behavior was affected by lottery outcomes after trading. This
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even was the case when selling under symmetric information where the lottery outcome was neither
informative about other traders’ behavior nor affected the trader’s earnings.19
When the fit of the seven models was compared, the models that performed better were ones with
more parameters. Comparison of the AIC and BIC figures which include penalties for the number
of free parameters suggests that the better performance is not due to over-fitting. Nevertheless, the
better performing models are in some senses more complex. For example, ALA, CLA, EWA, and
level-k all allowed individual heterogeneity whereas the equilibrium models did not. Most likely,
the performance of the models could be improved by adding additional features. These features
could include a tendency to place bids that are multiples of ten, a tendency for inertia (bidding
the same value as in the previous round) or a tendency to adjust bids towards previously observed
prices. Some degree of belief updating could be added to ALA. Whether such features are desirable
depends on the research question being addressed. Indeed had the purpose of this paper merely been
to model the average bidding shown in Figure 3, the extra complexity of ALA compared to CLA
and level-k would be hard to justify based on the relative performance of the models. It is settings
where behavior change is of interest that models like ALA are most relevant.
Turning to the implications of ALA, one might also wonder if the observed behavior, such as
willingness to trade increasing when previous trading has had better than anticipated outcomes,
would occur if the stakes were higher or the time period were longer. While it is hard to answer
these questions decisively, there is evidence that, even over longer periods and when the stakes are
high, personal experience influences behavior. For instance, Malmendier and Nagel (2011) find that
people who have experienced low stock market returns throughout their lives so far are less willing
to take financial risk, are less likely to participate in the stock market and invest a lower fraction of
their liquid assets in stocks if they do participate.
What are the wider consequences of people behaving as predicted by ALA? The direct conse-
quence is that there will be some potential trades that could make both parties better off but are not
executed. This means that welfare gains from trade will not be fully realized. Furthermore, there
are consequences to spillover effects. Suppose making a loss on a trade causes a person to be more
loss averse and generally more reluctant to trade. Institutions that protect buyers from making losses
on purchases will reduce the number of buyers suffering losses and, hence, loss aversion among
buyers. Examples of such institutions include legal rights for buyers of goods, additional guarantees
offered by some sellers, and financial redress for people who were mis-sold financial products. The
results of this paper suggest the designers of such institutions face several challenges. Not only must
the institutions alleviate the asymmetric information problem, they must also be attractive to people
who are loss averse and do not recognize that others have different information.
19One might conjecture that changing bidding behavior is due to risk aversion decreasing as experimental earnings are
accumulated. This could account for buying bids increasing over successive rounds. It could not account for the decay in
selling bids typically seen in repeated market experiments. Neither could it explain first round behavior where selling bids
exceed buying bids (implying sellers are less risk-averse) but buyers had higher incomes (in the experiment, buyers were
endowed with 100 points and sellers were endowed with the lottery). Furthermore, the decay of the WTA/WTP gap is also
observed in experiments where subjects are paid for one randomly selected round.
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